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Abstract 
ASEAN is in a unique position to push for greater global awareness and action for the vulnerable Pacific 
populations facing the possibility of relocation. Yet, it is strangely silent on the issue. ASEAN has both moral 
and legal obligation not to turn its back on its Pacific neighbors.  ASEAN is proximate to many Pacific nations, 
and it has both the resources and landmass to help: two of the world’s largest archipelagos are ASEAN members. 
Morally, the obligations of humanity and justice require larger and more developed states to aid and assist their 
more vulnerable neighbors. Legally, ASEAN may learn from the African Union (AU) experience. While AU 
accepted the UN Refugee Convention definition of ‘refugee,’ it expanded it to include those compelled to leave 
their country owing to ‘events seriously disturbing public order.’ Many scholars believe this includes the 
environmentally displaced. 
 
ASEAN can choose to take the easy path of insularity and parochialism as regards the looming issue of 
environmental migration, or it can take the high road by transforming itself into a dynamic regional actor 
pushing for clear policies on how to address it. Displacements are by nature traumatic and carry with them the 
impoverishments of landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, 
food insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation. ASEAN can do much to 
help its vulnerable neighbors. It is a strong voice in the international community asking it to help address the 
issue. 
 
Introduction 
Environmental changes are among the most serious threats faced by the world today. Yet, 
negotiations focus more on mitigation and less on adaptation, in spite the fact that potentially, 
the ‘greatest single impact’ of environmental change will be on ‘human migration and 
displacement’ (IPCC 1990). While migration would not be an only response to environmental 
changes, as affected populations may choose to adapt in situ or simply do nothing, yet it is a 
likely response for those whose homes and means of livelihood are within vulnerable 
locations. Still migration, as an adaptation response has rarely, if at all, reached national and 
regional agendas. While most migrations are projected to be temporary and internal with a 
rural to urban or coastal to higher ground mobility pattern, this is only true of larger islands 
and, generally, for those experiencing short term environmental events (Campbell & Bedford 
2012). For long-term processes, however, such as rising sea levels or irreversible salination of 
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fresh water reserves rendering low lying atoll countries uninhabitable, the prospect of an 
international relocation will have to be considered. 
 
This study examines an aspect of adaptation, namely the role of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) vis-à-vis the vulnerable Pacific island populations. The use of 
ASEAN in this paper is not limited to the regional association strictly, but includes its ten 
member countries individually. ASEAN is not new to massive displacements at both regional 
and international levels. For instance, ASEAN received, and helped facilitate the international 
resettlement of, Indochinese ‘boatpeople’ in the 70s and 80s. While the Indochinese refugee 
situation was triggered by political and not environmental causes, ASEAN’s response to the 
crisis –in particular its resort to international collaboration – provides important lessons for 
environmentally-induced migrations in the Pacific.  
 
A closer interpretation of international law documents and principles (which, though not 
binding, have persuasive force), considerations of humanity and political philosophy culled 
from various juristic writings point to an increased ASEAN involvement, if not downright 
‘obligation’ beyond state borders. Climate change is a global phenomenon requiring global 
response. It mandates progressive thinking, perhaps a veering from traditional realist to more 
cosmopolitan considerations and modes of problem solving. ASEAN may choose to respond 
from a parochial perspective by ignoring wider processes, or failing to heed the lessons of the 
past; or it may choose to transform itself into a relevant Asia-Pacific regional actor in 
addressing the globalizing effects of climate and environmental changes.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: First, an overview of ASEAN, and Pacific environmental 
situation. Second, a discussion on state obligations beyond national and regional borders 
using ASEAN’s experience on international mass migration from Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos (then non-ASEAN countries) as a learning experience for ASEAN should mass 
displacemenst occur, this time due to environmental factors. Third, the paper identifies key 
challenges in coming up with appropriate policies relative to the Pacific environmental 
situation. The paper concludes that a globally relevant ASEAN can help raise collective 
consciousness and action in rallying the international community to address climatic and 
environmental vulnerabilities. 
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Overview 
ASEAN  
Since its founding more than 40 years ago, ASEAN has proven to be a resilient regional 
association that has grown in reach and vision. From five nations founding the association on 
August 8, 1967, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, it has 
since added five more to its membership: Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Myanmar and Laos 
(both in 1997), and Cambodia (1999). East Timor is expected to be the 11th  member. From a 
mere joint political declaration, ASEAN has transformed itself into a legal entity by signing 
the 20 November 2007 ASEAN Charter – the region’s constitution – which was fully ratified 
by December 2008. The Charter aims to strengthen the ‘rule of law, and to promote and 
protect human rights’ (Art.1.7), reaffirms the region’s upholding of ‘international law, 
including international humanitarian law’ (Art 2.2) and the  ‘centrality of ASEAN in external 
political, economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-
looking, inclusive and non-discriminatory’ (Art 2.2). 
 
The Pacific  
For millennia, Pacific Islanders have moved across their vast region in search of 
opportunities, to satisfy a personal sense of adventure or else, to look for safe havens from 
natural or human-induced threats. Recent events and processes, however, suggest that 
migration triggered by environmental changes is expected to increase significantly over the 
coming years (IOM 2009). The Pacific region with its low-elevation island nations dispersed 
in a vast ocean setting makes it particularly vulnerable to challenges from the physical 
environment. The region is predicted to be among those where the adverse effects of 
environmental changes can be felt the most (Locke 2009). Climate and environmental 
changes are expected to have significant impacts on all the countries of the Pacific region, 
particularly the small atoll countries of Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tokelau and Tuvalu. 
This does not mean the larger island countries are not significantly vulnerable. The capital 
cities of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, not to mention other areas of 
heavy population and infrastructure concentration, are located along the coasts thereby 
exposed to long-term climatic processes. But while larger islands have higher grounds for 
populations to flee to, this option is not available to low-lying atoll nations. Given the 
possibility of even a ‘moderate amount of climate change over the next century,’ atoll 
countries may ultimately become unsustainable as human habitations (Barnett and Adger 
2001). 
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While the extent of impacts of environmental change is still subject to debate, plans for 
proactive migration of human populations are emerging. The Kiribati government approved 
the purchase of 2,282 hectares of land in Vanua Levu Island, Fiji, in 2012. Extending ‘10 km 
inland from the coast’ it has the potential for ‘supporting both agricultural as well as fisheries 
development’ (Campbell and Bedford 2012). While the land is for investment purposes, it is 
‘certainly one of a number of options for future residence for a central Pacific people who 
have long had to grapple with environmental uncertainty in their low-lying coral islands’ 
(Campbell and Bedford 2012). Kiribati’s President, Anote Tong, spoke in 2005 before the 
60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on the need for atoll countries to 
consider relocation of their populations. For Watson, former Chair of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), one of the dangers of land loss and displacement of 
populations is the ‘possible loss of whole cultures’ (Watson 2000). Thus, should relocation 
become imperative, what must be ensured is not only the physical survival of the inhabitants, 
but the continuation of their cultural and traditional legacies (UN General Assembly 2008). 
Their preservation in case of in situ adaptation or possible re-creation in host states in case of 
relocation are among the matters ASEAN can include into its own agenda, or else help bring 
to the larger international community for consideration. 
 
Obligation beyond state and regional borders 
Do states have obligations beyond national or regional borders? The answer would have 
implications to ASEAN on matters of environmental vulnerabilities of countries beyond its 
member states borders. Extraterritorial obligations arise from various sources, among them 
historical ties and treaties. For instance, colonialism has left the Pacific region with a 
‘complex legacy of legal and political associations’ (Opeskin & MacDermott 2009). Under 
New Zealand’s Citizenship Act of 1977, residents of New Zealand’s former colonies, the 
Cook Islands and Niue (now self-governing countries in free association with New Zealand), 
are considered to be New Zealand citizens with open migration access to New Zealand and 
access to its social services. Under the Citizenship Act, inhabitants of Tokelau, a New 
Zealand territory, are ipso facto New Zealand citizens. This agreement has implications for 
environmental migration and has facilitated the movement of former colonial peoples to New 
Zealand following devastating environmental events. In 1990, Hurricane Ofa ‘nearly 
necessitated an evacuation of the island [Niue] to New Zealand’ (Barker 2000). Additionally, 
Hurricanes Val (1992) and Percy (2005) destroyed most of Tokelau’s agriculture and led to 
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‘severe food shortages’ such that New Zealand had to relocate Tokelauans to New Zealand 
(Moore & Smith 1995). 
 
States cooperate and enter obligations with other states when it is in their interest to do so. 
From the rational choice parameters of realpolitik, states collaborate when direct or future 
benefits accrue. There will be an ‘unwillingness to continue cooperation should it become 
unfruitful to do so’ (Linklater 1977, p. 42). The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement allowing 
citizens of Australia or New Zealand to travel, live and work in each other’s state, cannot 
only be explained in light of past historical ties, but the economic benefits of a hassle-free 
exchange of visits, not to mention workers, from English speaking nations with a similar 
level of development. Papua New Guinea, which was part of the Australian commonwealth, 
but whose level of economy is deemed lagging behind that of Australia was not granted 
privileges. An exception, due to close cultural and geographical ties, are Torres Strait 
islanders who by treaty are given visa-free access to travel to Australia’s northern islands 
under the 1985 Torres Strait Treaty between Australia and Papua New Guinea.1 
 
Cosmopolitan considerations 
A corollary question would be, do states have an obligation to consider the needs of countries 
with whom they have neither historical ties, nor a reasonable expectation of economic 
benefits. I am referring in this instance to ASEAN vis-à-vis the environmentally vulnerable 
atoll countries of the Pacific. I will argue that ASEAN has an obligation when seen from a 
cosmopolitan rather than realist viewpoint. I will use historical, legal and humanitarian 
considerations why this is so. 
 
Historical 
It is helpful to examine past ASEAN practice regarding forced migrations. Southeast Asia is 
no stranger to internal and cross-border displacements from conflicts and environmental 
disasters. Among these are the 2004 tsunami that killed hundreds of thousands, and displaced 
over 1.6 million people of which more than 500,000 were from Indonesia (Meisl, Safaie et al. 
2006). The 2008 Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar’s worst storm in recorded history with over a 
hundred thousand dead and hundreds of thousands more displaced (Ozerdem 2010, p. 698.) 
In both cases, most of displacements were internal, with the displaced either returning of their 
homes or resettling in nearby villages (Gray 2010).  
                                                          
1 The Treaty allows Torres Strait residents of Papua New Guinea short visits to the Torres Strait Islands within 
Australian territory for traditional purposes, such as fishing and other traditional activities. 
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A well-known case of mass international displacements affecting ASEAN was the Indochina 
refugee crisis in the late 1970s. Although conventionally regarded as a situation triggered by 
conflict, the mass movements from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were in fact precipitated by 
a confluence of socio-economic factors, and not just conflict. In some ways, the experience 
demonstrates the distinction between conflict-induced migrants and those who were 
economically- or environmentally-displaced are far more blurred. For instance, what began as 
conflict – both regional and ethnic – resulted in ‘poverty and resource scarcity’ (Frost 1980, 
p.348). ‘[E]conomic grievances’ was a frequently cited reason for leaving, and over the years 
the movements were influenced by the pull of ‘distant relative[s] abroad who left in earlier 
waves.’ Thus, what ‘started as a refugee flow [had] increasingly come to resemble a 
migration flow’ (Suhrke 1981, p. 26). 
 
Between 1975 and 1979 over 270,000 Indochinese arrived by boat in Southeast Asia and 
Hong Kong [see Table 1], which created economic and social strain in the host countries.  
 
 TABLE 1 
Numbers of People arriving by Boat in Southeast Asia and Hongkong 
Year Number 
1975 377 
1976 5,248 
1977 15,657 
1978 85,544 
1979 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
 
8,954 
5,737 
11,157 
26,600 
51,550 
56,941 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Quoted in Frost 1980). 
 
At the insistence of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
December 1978 consultative meeting on displaced persons in Southeast Asia was convened 
where Thailand called for a wider sharing of the resettlement burden and limit of period of 
stay in ASEAN countries (UNHCR 1978). In July1979, a follow up consultative Meeting on 
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia was held and resulted in the formalization 
of the burden sharing principle among ASEAN and western countries. The burden sharing 
agreement was significant. Except for the Philippines (and later, Cambodia), none among the 
ASEAN countries have acceded to the two main international refugee law instruments, 
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namely the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention) and 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Refugee Protocol) (Davies 2008). 
Legally thus, non-convention countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand may 
consider Indochinese arrivals illegal aliens and refuse to grant asylum. Thailand refused over 
42,000 Cambodian refugees in late June 1979 while Malaysia towed boats back to sea (Stein 
1979). The July 1979 meeting resulted in an ASEAN commitment to non-refoulement and for 
the region to grant temporary asylum provided resettlement within third countries was 
assured (Stein 1997).  
 
Two main refugee processing centers were established, one on Galang Island in Indonesia 
and the other in the town of Morong, Bataan, the Philippines. A refugee camp was also 
established on Bidong Island in Malaysia. Another condition for acceptance was for the 
United States and the international community to bear the financial burden of maintaining the 
centers. At the insistence of ASEAN foreign ministers, another international meeting was 
held in 1989 in response to a renewed outflow of people seeking better living prospects 
following the footsteps of relatives and friends already resettled in more developed countries. 
The meeting, called the 1989 International Conference on Indochinese Refugees (ICIR), 
produced the Declaration and Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) which now involved the 
source country Vietnam’s cooperation. Thus, at the ICIR, Vietnam agreed to simultaneously 
control illegal boat departures for non-genuine refugees, while expanding opportunities of 
legal emigration from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program (ODP). The 
Vietnamese also agreed to accept returnees to be monitored by the UNHCR, and ‘not to take 
punitive measures against them’ (Frost 1980, p.9).  
 
By the 1990s the refugee crisis had subsided. If anything ASEAN has ‘successfully made the 
point that the Indochina refugee problem [was] an international problem, not solely, nor even 
primarily, a regional one’ (Frost 1980, p. 29). More research needs to be done on the 
ramifications of the Indochinese refugee situation. Forced displacements triggered by 
whatever type or cause is a global problem requiring global solutions. For more than 15 
years, ASEAN agreed to be the country of first asylum conditional on the international 
community’s sharing the ultimate burden of resettlement. Also, legal and diplomatic 
measures were taken to reduce the push factors that induced the people to leave. In the 
context of today’s vulnerabilities from environmental factors, this lesson translates to 
strengthening measures for in situ adaptation to enhance resilience and prevent forced 
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migration. Yet, should migration become necessary, as the ASEAN experience has shown, 
the international community’s coordination becomes an element in the search for durable 
solutions.   
 
Legal 
Admittedly, neither ASEAN nor its member states have direct treaty, customary law or 
domestic law obligation to aid, much less admit, cross-border environmental migrants. Unlike 
the African Union which has arguably - at least on paper - provisions for environmentally 
displaced ‘refugees,’2 or Spain3 which signed a treaty admitting those affected by the 
volcanic eruption in Colombia for temporary and seasonal work, and,  unlike Sweden4 and 
Finland5 which both have domestic laws recognizing non-national environmental migrants as 
a discrete category deserving protection, ASEAN’s member states do not as yet have legal 
protections in place, beyond normal and pre-existing migration channels. Yet, a closer 
interpretation of international law documents and principles reveals ASEAN may be obliged 
to help. Granting, arguendo, the documents and principles do not bind, or if they bind, states 
may ignore them for them for want of a monitoring or enforcement body, still they are 
persuasive, and the international community may reasonably expect – if not demand – 
compliance. 
                                                          
2OAU (1969). Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa,  adopted on 10 September 1969 and entered into force 20 June 1974. Art 1 (2) Art 1 (2) states: ‘The 
term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside 
his country of origin or nationality.’ The definition could potentially include the environmentally displaced. In 
Africa, there is the regional practice of allowing those affected by natural disasters such as famine and drought 
to enter international borders. While some governments are careful not to characterize the practice as an outright 
obligation arising from the AU treaty definition, it may be argued that the definition can contribute to the 
development of the protection rights for the environmentally displaced on. See Edwards, A. 2006, ‘Refugee 
Status Determination in Africa', African Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol.14, no.2. 
3 Colombian Temporary and Circular Labour Migration Scheme (TCLM). According to Noor, ‘[w]hen in 2006 
the Galeras volcano in southwest Colombia erupted, the TCLM programme, which targets different vulnerable 
communities, was used to provide a migration opportunity for thousands of affected people. This programme 
allowed them to temporarily migrate to Spain, where they could earn an income in seasonal harvest. Afterwards, 
the programme was also expanded to rural populations, whose crops and land are particularly vulnerable to 
floods, droughts and other environmental disruptions.’ Nicole de Moor, Temporary Labour Migration for 
Victims of Natural Disasters: The Case of Colombia, paper prepared for UNU-EHS Summer Academy on 
Social Vulnerability, Hohenkammer, Germany, 25-31 July 2010 
4Swedish Aliens Act, Ch 4, s.2(3) (2006).The Swedish Aliens Act, Chapter 4, Section 2(3) defines a ‘person 
otherwise in need of protection’ as an alien ‘unable to return to the country of origin because of an 
environmental disaster.’ Chapter 5, Section1 entitles ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ to a ‘residence 
permit.’ 
5Finnish Aliens Act, Ch. 6 s.109 (1) (2009).The Finnish Aliens Act, Chapter 6 Section109(1) on the other hand, 
grants ‘[t]emporary protection’ to aliens in ‘need [of] international protection and who cannot return safely to 
their home country or country of permanent residence, because there has been…an environmental disaster.’ 
Temporary protection may be for a ‘short duration,’ and ‘lasts for a maximum of three years in total.’ 
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The ASEAN nations and the small Pacific island states are members of the United Nations. 
As members they pledged to ‘achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems,’ likewise in ‘promoting and encouraging respect for human rights’.6The question 
is whether the obligation relates only to the state’s population, or populations within their 
territories, or whether the obligation extends to peoples outside the state. What is settled is 
that under customary international law, broadly applying the principle of state responsibility, 
states must refrain from acts causing harm to another state.7 The prohibition to commit acts 
of genocide, piracy, slavery, torture and generally violation of peremptory norms (jus cogens) 
is a universal obligation, and applies to inter-state relations. These are however, mainly 
negative obligations.  
 
The question arises: Do states have positive obligation towards other states? Under 
international human rights law, everyone has the right to life (UDHR 1948; ICCPR 1966). 
The right to life is one of the foundational principles of international relations. Likewise, 
every person has a right to adequate food, clothing, housing and the continuous improvement 
of living conditions, (ICESCR 1966) and everyone has the right not to be deprived of his or 
her means of subsistence (ICCPR 1966). While the right to life, like the right to food, is 
compellable as a negative right under international customary law, e.g. the right not to be 
killed or not to be intentionally starved as when another nations’ food supply is cut off, it may 
not be compellable when expressed as a positive right, e.g. compel medical treatment when 
sick. Be that as it may, under General Comment No. 12 of the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, ‘[s]tates have a joint and individual responsibility, in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, to cooperate in providing disaster relief and 
humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and 
internally displaced persons’ (UN Committee 1995). While internationally displaced 
environmental migrants are not included, they are not excluded, hence may be subsumed 
among those requiring ‘disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.’ It is submitted, that in the 
event of long-term environmental impacts of extreme weather rendering islands uninhabitable, 
                                                          
6UN Charter, art. 1(3), signed 26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.s. No.993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 24 
October 1945. Under Art 1(3), among the purposes for which the United Nations was established was to 
‘achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or 
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.’ It is submitted that ‘humanitarian’ in 
this context is used in its generic, i.e. the promotion of human welfare generally, and not restricted to conflict 
situations.  
7Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941). 
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humanitarian assistance includes not only food and medical supplies but the possibility of 
permanent relocation. While not all 10 ASEAN countries ratified the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR),8 it may be argued the non-signatory countries are nonetheless 
bound to observe international human rights law principles under customary international law.  
 
ASEAN is in a position of strength to promote the adoption of both international and regional 
legal frameworks relative to the environmental and human-mobility impacts of climate 
change. ASEAN’s experience in the areas of environment and forced migration demonstrates 
its capacity. The ASEAN-brokered 2002 Agreement on Transboundary Haze which entered 
into force on 25 November 2003 is considered a global role model in tackling transnational 
haze issues and the 2004 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons explicitly 
addresses the issue of human trafficking particularly of women and children. While ASEAN 
may not solely bear the brunt of resettlement responsibility, it need not remain silent on the 
issue of cross border climate change displacements. For instance, the ASEAN Declaration on 
Environmental Sustainability recognizes the need to develop an ASEAN climate change 
initiative. Yet, it only goes as far as pushing for the building of environmentally sustainable 
cities, the promotion of alternative energy sources, energy efficiency and energy security 
(Yuen & Kong 2009).   
 
Moral 
Beyond legal conceptions, does ASEAN have moral obligations towards environmentally 
vulnerable populations beyond state borders? The nature of justice and moral responsibilities 
between nationals of the same state has been the subject of rigorous philosophical inquiry. 
For instance, Rawls, in reviving the social contractarian tradition argued that while an equal 
distribution of natural talents and acquired wealth may not be avoided, justice requires natural 
talents to become a ‘common asset’ among those sharing a bond of membership in a society. 
 
Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their 
good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. 
The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but 
only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in 
ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural 
capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not 
                                                          
8Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Myanmar have not ratified ICCPR or ICESCR; while Laos ratified the 
ICESCR and only signed but did not ratify the ICCPR. All other ASEAN member states ratified both treaties.  
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follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal 
with them. The basic structure of society can be arranged so that these 
contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate [the ‘difference principle’] 
(Rawls 1971, p. 17). 
 
But while notions of justice and moral obligations are more of less settled in a state setting, 
comparatively little attention has been directed to them in a global setting’ (Opeskin 1995, 
p.20). Are the principles of justice and moral responsibility applicable in a world setting? If 
so, what are they and from where are they based. May humanity be regarded a single 
community? In this context, does ASEAN have moral obligation towards vulnerable Pacific 
nations which may have to consider the possibility of international relocation?  
 
Most of us intuitively acknowledge a moral obligation to ‘relieve human suffering or distress’ 
when doing so would not equally endanger our life and limb (Opeskin 1996). Such an 
approach stems from our common humanity and is most manifest in one’s instinctive – 
almost reflexive – response to save a drowning person from a pool, either by ourselves or 
through another. Admittedly, the demand to respond to such a situation is more compelling 
within those closest to us: family, neighbors, community. Yet, visitors in a foreign land on 
their holidays would be equally pressed to save a drowning local child should they be in a 
proximate situation to do so. The obligation thus is not limited to blood relations or 
psychological proximity, but one rooted in our basic humanity, the sameness of the human 
condition we all share. Writing on the universal obligation to help famine victims of 
Bangladesh in the early 70’s, Singer posits that such an obligation extends to individuals 
beyond state borders (Singer 1972). His argument is premised on the fact that suffering from 
lack of food and medicine is bad, and that it is within the power of other states to prevent or 
relieve the suffering in such a situation. Singer believes that the more privileged nations can 
do something to reduce the number of starving people without giving up the basic necessities 
themselves.  
 
Governments across the region have expressed interest in human displacement. The Inter-
Governmental Asia-Pacific Consultations on Refugees, Displaced Persons and Migrants 
(APC), founded in 1996, provides a forum relevant to forced migration issues to explore 
opportunities for regional cooperation, while the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission of 
Human Rights (AICHR) established in September 2009, identified migration among its 
concerns. In 2009, the Maritime Minister of Indonesia announced that Indonesia was 
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considering renting out some of its islands to ‘climate change refugees’ (Holland 2009). The 
announcement augurs well for ASEAN and provides a counter-point to parallel 
considerations regarding environmental migrants as non-traditional threats to the region. 
 
Challenges to Long-term Resettlement  
Lack of common agreement 
Among ASEAN’s challenges in explicitly addressing environmental migration in general and 
Pacific environmental migration in particular is the lack of a common agreement on the 
definition of environmental migration. The conceptual, and consequently legal, parameters of 
the term are at most hazy and blur with existing definitions of ‘refugee’, ‘internal displacees,’ 
or ‘labour, circular or seasonal migrants.’ Displaced populations due to cyclones, volcanic 
eruptions and tsunamis have the refugee-like characteristics of being forced out of their homes 
due to life threatening factors. Yet, unlike refugees and refugee-like peoples, environmental 
migrants are not covered by an international legal framework. In international law, 
environmental migrants are not a ‘formal category of people in need of special protection’ 
(McAdam and Saul 2008); neither is there a ‘coordinated legal and administrative system’ to 
relocate them in a ‘planned and orderly manner’ (Millar 2007, p.71). There is as yet little 
international support for a new normative category (Kolmannskog 2009); and the difficulty of 
getting policy-makers to act cannot be underestimated (Sriskandarajah 2008, p.61). 
 
ASEAN may learn from the African Union (AU) by expanding the definition of ‘refugee.’ 
While the AU accepted the UN Refugee Convention’s definition of ‘refugee,’ it expanded it 
to include  those compelled to leave their country owing to ‘events seriously disturbing public 
order’ (OAU 1969). The definition could potentially include the environmentally displaced. 
In Africa, there is the regional practice of allowing those affected by natural disasters such as 
famine and drought to enter international borders. While some governments are careful not to 
characterize the practice as an outright obligation arising from the AU treaty definition, it 
may be argued that the definition can contribute to the development of the protection rights 
for the environmentally displaced on ‘humanitarian grounds under customary international 
law’ (Edwards 2006).  
ASEAN may also learn from state practice where environmental migration policies are in 
place, albeit embryonic. Sweden and Finland have legislated protection mechanisms for 
victims of ‘environmental disasters’. Swedish immigration policy names environmental 
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migrants as a separate category of ‘person in need of protection’ (Swedish Aliens Act 2006). 
The Finnish Aliens Act grants residence permits to those who ‘cannot return because of an 
armed conflict or environmental disaster’ (Finnish Aliens Act 2009). Further, an alien 
residing in Finland is issued with a ‘residence permit on the basis of humanitarian protection 
if… he or she cannot return to his or her country of origin or country of former habitual 
residence as a result of an environmental catastrophe’. Although the preparatory works to the 
Aliens Act state that the preferred option in environmental disasters is ‘internal relocation and 
international humanitarian aid,’ the Act expressly acknowledges that protection in Finland 
may become necessary (UNHCR 2009). 
 
Nature of environmental migration 
Another challenge for ASEAN policy makers is the nature of environmental migration. Much 
like other environmental problems such as sea and air pollution, the cause and effects of 
environmental displacements often transcend national borders. Yet, the existing structure of 
the international system is dominated by state-centrism. Based on international law principles 
of territorial integrity and sovereignty, States have full discretion as to who or who not to 
admit into their bounded territory (Zilbershats 2002). However, in an increasingly 
interconnected world with globalized problems this causes difficulties. Climate change and 
its effects respect no borders. ASEAN thus needs to find responsive paradigms and solutions 
that fit the global nature of the challenge.  
 
One of ASEAN’s strengths is it is already a step removed from strict state-centrism. By its 
founding it recognized that there are areas of endeavour within the region needing collective 
and collaborative responses. An example would be the previously discussed refugee crisis, 
when boatloads of Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian refugees spilled over to neighbouring 
ASEAN countries. Ultimately, the refugees were taken in, albeit temporarily, while awaiting 
resettlement in third countries, and refugee centers were established in Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. 
 
A humanitarian imperative rarely determines a host country’s resettlement decision. Instead 
these are influenced by political expediency, media clamour, ideology as well as shared 
history and culture. Yet, this should not prevent the ASEAN from learning from countries 
who relaxed border controls following environmental catastrophes, albeit devoid of a shared 
colonial past. 
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Following the December 2004 Asian tsunami, Canada announced it was fast tracking landed-
immigrant status for those affected. By March 2005, about 1,000 applications had been 
expedited. The Department of Immigration also announced it would expedite family 
sponsorships of persons coming from the affected areas. Canadian immigration officials also 
met with members of the Indonesian, Indian, Somali and Sri Lankan communities in Toronto 
to coordinate the role these communities would have in assisting the resettlement of the 
migrants. Australia likewise fast-tracked migration applications as well as placed priority on 
the handing of temporary protection visas for the displaced tsunami victims (Laczko and 
Collett 2005). 
 
Prospects for Pacific Peoples 
Relocated communities often find themselves in a ‘state of discontent’ with many finding 
themselves wanting to return to their home islands (Campbell, Goldsmith et al. 2005). A 
‘sense of loss’ is especially pronounced in environmental disasters, where the relocated 
populations are suddenly uprooted from their traditional lands and systems (Kirsch 2001). 
There is a strong bond between the Pacific islanders; in most cases people and land are 
‘inseparable’ (Campbell, Goldsmith et al. 2005). While regular migration options depend on 
individual decisions and the ‘fit’ between the migrants’ qualifications and host state’s 
requirements, community relocation whether in the ASEAN region or elsewhere presents 
crucial operational if not ethical questions, among them are as follows: 
 
1. Responsibility – Who is responsible for the relocation? Do neighboring states have 
moral and legal obligation under human rights principles to facilitate relocations when 
necessitated? Past relocations were initiated by government and development agencies 
following natural calamities. These relocations were of a humanitarian and temporary 
nature. Evacuees were expected to return after the disaster has passed. For long-term 
processes such as desertification and possible sea-level rise, permanent relocation is 
the only option. Many of these relocations are expected to cross international borders. 
The resettlement of Carteret Islander families in Bougainville was made possible by 
the Papua New Guinea government which has jurisdiction over both sending and 
receiving islands (Parry 2006). For the smaller Pacific states, their only recourse is 
international relocation.  
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2. Timing – Relocation is a complex process that requires entire communities to be 
uprooted. As such, it requires not only preparation but physical and psychological 
readiness on the part of both the relocatees and the host communities. Considering 
that natural disasters exacerbated by climate change can happen any time, an early 
preparation is imperative. Kelman suggests an early planning but delayed departure 
scheme (Kelman 2006). This means contingency measures such as the identification 
or advance purchase of relocation sites would have to be done, but delayed departure 
when necessary. The delayed departure permits ‘psychological and logistical’ 
readiness and saves ‘decades of productive island life’ (Kelman 2006). 
 
3. Funding – Relocation involves costs. These can include preparation and 
transportation of communities, and the setting up of infrastructure in the relocation 
site. This includes roads, housing and utilities. Eventually, provisions for the setting 
up of schools, health centers would have to be made available as well. In the case of 
Banaba, a resettlement trust fund has been set up years prior to the relocation. This 
was made possible out of Banaba island’s phosphate royalties. Funding for climate 
change adaptation may require multilateral cooperation. Although criticized by some 
as difficult for third world nations to access, the United Nations administered Global 
Environment Facility GEF Trust Fund, which includes the Least Developed Countries 
Trust Fund (LDCTF) and Special Climate Change Trust Fund (SCCF) offers promise 
for countries which may require resettlement due to climate change. 
 
Already, the government of Indonesia has set up the Indonesia Climate Change Trust 
Fund (ICCTF) which supports climate change mitigation and adaptation projects 
within Indonesia. The ICCTF receives contributions from bilateral and multilateral 
donors for the purpose. The Indonesian experience can be used as a blue-print for the 
establishment of an ASEAN Climate Change Trust Fund. This ASEAN fund may 
already include provisions for possible resettlement options within and outside of 
ASEAN borders.   
 
4. Relocation site - Australia and New Zealand are often mentioned as possible 
resettlement sites due to proximity and level of economic development. A 
disadvantage would be possible loss of an island culture if resettlement is made in 
metropolitan cities, whereas an island in Indonesia or the Philippines would more or 
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less provide similar tropical island surroundings. This means arrangements would 
have to be made involving multilateral actors. ASEAN would be in a good position to 
broker logistics and preparation: from identifying temporary processing centers 
similar to the Bataan refugee center pending final placements, to the purchase or lease 
of tracts of agricultural lands as relocation sites; when feasible, outright ceding of 
existing islands or creation of artificial islands may be considered. Territorial claims 
aside, Layang-Layang island in the Spratly Islands was artificially created by 
Malaysia by way of reclaiming the shallow sea in between two reefs.  
 
Conclusion  
Around 10 per cent – 550 million- of the world’s population live on its 180,498 islands, of 
which some 30,000 are in the Pacific. More than one fifth or 22 per cent of the world’s 
sovereign states are exclusively island states (Kelman 2006). Although islands occupy just 1.86 
per cent of the Earth’s land surface area, 13.1 per cent -or 106 out of 812 – of UNESCO’s 
World Heritage sites are on islands.  
 
The various cultural heritages of the Pacific Islands are important in their own right, and the 
necessity of preserving them cannot be underestimated. Islands yield a rich array of the 
world’s languages, beliefs, livelihood systems as well as unique social, political and 
governmental structures. Pacific island states account for an unusually high percentage of the 
world’s linguistic and cultural output. Over a third of all known languages are spoken in the 
four Pacific countries of the Melanesian region: New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomons and Vanuatu (Pernetta 1992). Pacific islands are also home to distinctive mores, 
cultures, indigenous knowledge, and ecological features that cannot be duplicated elsewhere. 
Islanders’ indigenous knowledge, albeit increasingly diminishing in the modern age, 
mitigates extreme impacts of natural disasters. The indigenous knowledge of Solomon 
Islanders helped residents recognize impending signs of the 2 April 2007 tsunami thereby 
reducing casualties (McAdoo, Moore et al. 2009). While the island characteristics of 
isolation, low elevation, small size and resource base make them more vulnerable to 
environmental threats, yet, their isolated societies also produce tight kinship networks and a 
strong sense of community that help address challenges cohesively (Howorth 2005). 
 
That the Pacific is extremely vulnerable to long-term environmental processes cannot be 
overemphasized. In Kiribati where groundwater is the ‘main source of drinking water’ on most 
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islands, residents have been ‘forced to migrate temporarily to areas with higher rainfall’ (Roy 
& Connell 1991). Some of these processes are said not to be caused by climate change but by 
neglect, short-sightedness in implementation of construction projects and mismanagement. 
Connell argues that in Tuvalu, for instance, the construction of roads between islands had 
blocked the natural lagoon to ocean channels; that the dredging and sea wall construction, 
airport runway sealing and land reclamation have ‘all transformed the topography of tiny 
islands’ and ‘ensured that the effects of storms and high tides are different to those in earlier 
times’ (Connell 2003, p.104). In any case, low lying atoll states such as Tuvalu remain 
vulnerable to long term environmental processes such as climate change. 
 
ASEAN is in a unique position to push for heightened global awareness and action for the 
vulnerable Pacific populations facing the possibility of relocation. Yet, it is strangely silent on 
the issue. ASEAN has both moral and legal obligation not to turn its back on its Pacific 
neighbors. Morally, ASEAN is geographically, albeit not politically, part of the Pacific region. 
It is proximate to many Pacific nations, and it has both the resources and landmass to help: two 
of the world’s largest archipelagos are ASEAN members. The obligations of humanity and 
justice require larger and more developed states aid and assist their more vulnerable neighbors. 
Calamity becomes an injustice if those who could have ‘undertaken preventive action’ were 
remiss, or ‘failed to try’ (Sen 2009). Legally, international human rights instruments mandate 
everyone to observe the duty to preserve life, the right to life being one of the foundational 
principles of international relations. ASEAN may learn from the African Union (AU) 
experience. While AU accepted the UN Refugee Convention definition of ‘refugee’, it 
expanded it to include those compelled to leave their country owing to ‘events seriously 
disturbing public order.’ Many scholars believe this includes the environmentally displaced. 
 
ASEAN can choose to take on the easy path of insularity and parochialism as regards the 
looming issue of environmental migration, or it can take the high road by transforming itself 
into a dynamic regional actor pushing for clear policies on how to address it. Displacements 
are by nature traumatic and carry with them the impoverishments of landlessness, 
joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food 
insecurity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation (Cernea & 
McDowell 2000). ASEAN can do much to help its vulnerable neighbors. With its 
archipelagos and off shore islands it can open its doors to vulnerable Pacific populations. 
Resettlement may be permanent or else temporary, pending determination of the 
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environmental migrants’ permanent home, as in the case of Vietnamese and Cambodian 
refugees. At the very least, ASEAN can help raise global consciousness and awareness in 
rallying the international community to collectively address the issue. 
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